We have seen debates or, more correctly, a constant opposition in the media after the government announced the Constituency Development Grant (CDG) last April for implementation. The National Council and Opposition Party which objected to the grant mainly for being unconstitutional are dismayed at the government for pushing it in a hurry. The government believes that as CDG has been approved by the parliament, it should operationalize it quickly to give the National Assembly members time to scout for projects in their constituencies.

I applaud the government’s objective “of reaching the unreached, covering the uncovered, and also getting the people to think and devise innovative ways of improving their livelihood in concert with their members in addition to the normal run-of-the-mill development activities.” A grant of Nu. 10 million in five years for each 47 member is an assured and flexible source of money at his disposal to support the community in his constituency during his tenure.

In the absence of a supreme court, only a Royal intervention can put to rest the doubt whether the grant is constitutional or not. But beyond this legal nicety, there are more important issues to reflect upon. What makes CDG different from normal budgetary financing for development? Wasn’t the 10th Plan extended for a year precisely to give time to the members and newly-elected government to align the Plan with the political manifesto? Is it correct to imply that the members have no say in “the normal run-of-the-mill development activities” when their job is to find solutions to major problems in their constituencies? Each member had the opportunity last year to incorporate major needs of its constituency in the Plan.

If additional money was available, one could implement more projects. But even so, would such projects be really in the priority if these are not included in the Plan? So, there is nothing novel about projects to be financed by CDG. Nor will it represent an additional fund as it has to be extracted from normal development budget.

More importantly, there is a risk of the legislative branch of government being involved in an executive role. As the executive arm, the cabinet has to implement the Plan with the support of the civil service and local government both of which are apolitical. Projects under CDG are jointly initiated by the member and people in his constituency. The rules allow the member to alter the approved financing criteria to suit him and his supporters in the constituency. He is not only encouraged to participate in local governing bodies as an observer in the selection of projects but he is also the final authority for approving them. Hence, the member and his core supporters can manoeuvre the way in which projects are selected and approved. The latter will not always have the real interest of the communities in mind but that of political gain and expediency. This will give an added advantage to a sitting member in the next general election and thus flout the principle of free and fair elections. Contrary to the government’s expectation, I fear that CDG may also counter the goal of good governance by compromising the legislative role of the member and the principle of separation of powers of the three branches of government.

Moreover, CDG entails an additional layer in the existing structure of local government involving the Gewog, Thromde and Dzongkhag. This will give rise to conflict of authority and interest in project selection and implementation thereby undermining the independent functioning of the local government. The CDG rules and procedures are also too complex to assure smooth implementation of projects.